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This report discusses a few selected co-operation ideas, considered important 
for the EU-Mercosul Agreement. We explore four sectoral themes: phyto-sanitary and 
agricultural  co-operation;  foreign  direct  investment;  telecommunications  and 
information technology; and cultural co-operation. We also launch a more strategic 
option, indirectly contained in the EU agenda: mechanisms for dispute settlement co-
operation in the WTO. Up to our knowledge this is an innovation. 
As a theoretical framework for analysing co-operation efforts, we use the view 
of regional integration agreements (RIAs) as an impure public good, and the idea of 
the “trade and co-operation nexus” (T+C), involving systematic co-operation in both 
trade-related and non-trade areas. 
The complexity  of  nowadays RIAs  forces negotiators to  look for help in 
specialised groups of society, directly concerned with the particular issues at stake; 
large segments of the country remaining unaware of the potential benefits that could 
accrue to all. The result is that nonexcludability of the integration, as a public good, is 
impaired. Once this happens, nonrivalness in “consumption” of the integration may 
easily become vapid, as many people do not know how to participate in its benefits. 
Nonrivalness  can  also  be  impaired  due  to  the  different  timings  required  for  each 
benefit to become reality, what may trigger a competition among the well informed on 
the sequence of implementing the agreement’s measures. 
One way of minimising these effects is a comprehensive (T+C), that will 
engage other groups beyond the negotiators and trade-related actors, increasing the 
awareness  and  understanding  of  the  integration,  while  boosting  its  purely  trade 
aspects.  
Co-operation  also  shares  a  political  economy  dimension  with  the  trade 
negotiations. The choice of the favoured areas may be viewed as the outcome of 
interactions among domestic “co-operation lobbies”, and the joint acceptance of the 
final agenda can be seen under the light of an external interaction of these forces. Without denying this view, we take it as a second-order consideration, which might 
be useful in certain instances.     
Few and well focussed projects seem the optimal starting point for building a 
successful (T+C) nexus.  
 
Phyto-sanitary measures and agriculture 
Problems  have  been  marring  the  reasonably  good  reputation  enjoyed  by 
Mercosul’s meat exports to the EU. The first is the serious epidemics that attacked 
different  Uruguayan  herds.  Secondly,  questions  regarding  the  EU  bovine  meat 
traceability requirements were raised for the Brazilian produce. Though the latter has 
not  been  used  as  a  trade  restriction  yet,  the  EU  authorities  have  signalled  that 
fulfilling such requirements are an important condition for supplying the EU market. 
Co-operation in the definition and application of the sanitary measures and, in the 
particular case of traceability, on the proper checking and measurement techniques, 
will ease tensions in both sides and pave the way to a fuller and more open trade in 
agriculture between them. 
Attitudes towards GMOs in the US and the EU are considered to oppose each 
other, the former being seen as open to transgenics and the latter as strongly resistant 
to their introduction. Mercosul, as a whole, would broadly be placed between these 
two  poles,  with  Argentina  leaning  closer  to  the  US  approach  and  Brazil  being 
nowadays one or two steps ahead of the EU standing. The EU has tough regulations 
on labelling and traceability of products that, somewhere in the production chain, used 
GMOs. These regulations are due to become stricter after new requirements to be 
issued by next November. In the Brazilian case, transgenic soybeans are the major 
target, given the country’s position as a main soya exporter and the diversified use of 
this crop in other agricultural and animal produce. At present, many issues are at 
stake, including the minimum percentage of transgenics that would make labelling 
mandatory. Given Mercosul’s intermediate position, and the initial stage of regulatory 
and safety measures for a wider use in a main exporter like Brazil, co-operation in 
GMOs  policy  is  an  important  area  where  the  more  convergence  is  achieved,  the 
higher are the gains for both partners.   
  Investment and related issues 
The four Mercosul countries share a greater identity with the EU – rather than 
with the US or other developed nations – in their international position regarding 
foreign investment. This common view could act as a starting point for a fruitful co-
operation scheme. 
  The Colonia Protocol, dealing with investment rules for Mercosul, lies semi-
abandoned, and not even in the EU one finds a fully harmonised situation. The two 
blocs could then develop a serious co-operation programme with the limited objective 
of  having  a  single,  bloc-to-bloc  policy  on  FDI.  This  would  be  an  incentive  for 
Mercosul pushing forward its own set of common rules, while both blocs would try to 
design basic criteria applicable to all member countries.  
EU’s  FDI  in  Mercosul  is  mainly  a  business  of  five  members  –  the  UK, 
Germany, France, Spain and Portugal -, the other actors having a more limited and 
less diversified presence. On the other hand, Mercosul FDI in the EU is basically 
located in Portugal and Spain. A specific-to-general approach, in which rules and 
procedures would be first polished with the main agents and then submitted to the 
corresponding general bodies, could bear interesting fruits in a short time horizon.  
 
Telecommunications and information technology 
  The first co-operation nexus in this context is migration from second (2G) to 
third generation (3G) of cell phones networks, a process highly dependent on the 
structure and technology of the existing 2G network. The new 3G environments will 
achieve nearly total convergence among fixed and mobile voice services, data and 
image  transmission,  Internet  and  multimedia  services.  This  means  a  prospectively 
huge enterprise in both blocs, specially in Mercosul where telecoms penetration lags 
behind the EU. Co-operation here means the possibility of very significant gains in 
the medium to long-run. The point of departure is in the EU’s favour, as establishment 
of the 2G network has not been completed yet in Mercosul. In Brazil, half of the 
existing cell-phones networks use the phased out TDMA (Time Division Multiple 
Access) technology and are still being replaced by the two competitive (US or EU) 
standards. 
The second area is digital TV. Again, though the EU has already defined its 
standard, the DBV, things have not been settled in Mercosul yet. Argentina already opted for the other competing standard. If Brazil adopts the DBV, or a hybrid form, 
there will be significant scope for technical co-operation. 
A third issue is Internet access and penetration. Both in Mercosul as in the EU, 
there  are  clear  signs  that  Internet  traffic  will  progressively  dominate 
telecommunications flows. This will have a great impact, demanding more peering-
backbone connections, in which a peripheral internet user is directly connected to an 
internet  backbone.  No  Mercosul  country  has  such  a  connection  nowadays,  what 
amounts to higher internet costs to all its members, as backbones are located either in 
the US or the EU. Co-operation in order to implement such cost-reducing measure, as 
well as on the issues of taxation and use of broadband connections is clearly needed. 
 
Culture 
Co-operation funds in the framework of the agreement could be directed at 
three objectives. The first would be a common definition of a cultural firm, which 
would  enjoy  specific  privileges  in  both  regional  spaces,  being  able  to  particular 
concessions  and,  sometimes,  identical  working  and  performing  conditions.  The 
concessions would mean greater flexibility and easiness in its mobility and activities 
throughout the two blocs, while the identical conditions would open the possibility to 
enjoy the same grants, facilities and liberties given to the local firms. This is a bold 
proposition which would demand further study from both sides.  
The second proposal deals with the audiovisual services, where there exist 
identities in both sides of the Atlantic and the two blocs are competitive with respect 
to each other. Mercosul movies are well accepted in the EU, the same applying, in 
principle, to the EU ones; both however lack powerful distribution channels. It may 
be  hard  to  believe  that,  given  the  enormous  pressure  the  US  industry  makes  on 
Brussels for total liberalisation of this sector, the EU would be able to make a special 
opening  to  Mercosul.  However,  the  point  here  is  not  on  GATS  plus  rules  for 
Mercosul,  but  on  co-operation  aiming  at  improving  distribution  channels  and 
increasing penetration in both regions. Truly, between a GATS commitment and local 
regulations there is margin for manoeuvre; a margin that, without harming the non-
discrimination clause, can be used to the benefit of a partner. 
The third project relates to property rights. In this area, not only counterfaiting 
is a problem, but due and fast appropriation of rights, in the multiple instances they 
generate revenue in the cultural world, is also problematic. Co-operation would mean to streamline procedures in both sides, so that rights and royalties would be quickly 
collected and remmitted, at the same time that enforcement would receive special 
attention.         
 
Dispute settlement co-operation in the WTO 
Considerable  time  and  energy  would  be  saved  if,  within  a  co-operation 
framework,  both  blocs  created  a  previous  consultation  system  for  any  potential 
dispute at the WTO. The system would perform a preliminary analysis of the juridical 
foundations of the complaint, trying to reach a friendly solution. In this effort, both 
parties would make an evaluation of the costs and benefits of engaging in a WTO 
panel, in contrast to the gains in a quick, internal solution. Advice on the best legal 
ways to conduct the case would also be provided.  
The proposal encompasses the dispute settlement procedure discussed in the 
ongoing negotiations. This one relates only to the disputes that could emerge in the 
framework  of  the  agreement,  while  the  co-operation  envisaged  deals  with  all 
potential WTO cases. It would also be a privileged source of information, with the 
blocs exchanging views and strategies even when they are only one of the two main 
parties. 
Finally,  better  guidance  would  be  provided  on  the  choice  of  a  domestic 
commercial  defence  case  versus  a  WTO  panel.  This  is  a  point  where  reciprocal 
ignorance - by EU exporters on the Mercosul members defence systems and, from 
Mercosul, on the elaborate EU foreign trade legislation - accounts for a considerable 
waste of time and resources in solving cases which do not necessarily justify a panel.     
Implementation of the idea is not difficult as the basic cell would be the body 
created  for  the  Agreement,  which  –  in  the  co-operation  project  –  would  receive 
supplementary funds for performing its enlarged activities.  
  
In spite of their diversity, all projects can be viewed as trade-enhancing, and 
so, as economic co-operation. This has a practical importance because economic co-
operation has not been closed in the negotiations yet and, if needed, all the proposals 
can be put under this umbrella. 
Most projects have a true regional perspective, as opposed to a country basis. 
This  will  demand a  higher  cohesion  from  Mercosul  in  order  to  design  consistent regional  co-operation  programmes.  As  a  side  effect,  co-operation  will  also  help 
deepening the integration.  
  All  initiatives  outlined  could  make  for  a  diversified  and  engaging  agenda, 
ultimately broadening the perception and impact of the Agreement. However, other 
possibilities still remain. One relates to structural adjustment co-operation. Though 
the Agreement creates a good occasion to tackle the structural adjustment issue under 
the co-operation heading, it seems completely far-fetched to count on EU money for 
this.  The  difficulties  caused  by  the  shifts  in  the  EU  programme,  from  the 
Iberian/Mediterranean  members  to  the  enlargement  countries,  and  the  increasing 
demands  the  latter  continue  to  make,  show  that  there  is  no  room  for  an  extra-
territorial,  Southern  Cone  initiative  in  this  field.  Mercosul  must  face  the  regional 
funds  problem,  but  must  also  tackle  it  with  its  own  resources  and  creativity.  Of 
course,  it  would  be  foolish  not  to  use  the  immense  experience  the  EU  has  with 
adjustment questions, when designing Mercosul’s measures. If, by chance, a clear 
project in this area is identified, with mutual benefits, then nothing should stop it to 
figure in a next co-operation round. 
 
 1. Introduction. 
 
Since  the  1996  EU-Mercosul  Framework  Agreement,  the  Commission  has 
emphasised  the  co-operation  aspects  of  any  trade  relations,  something  that 
gained importance in the present negotiations for the Free Trade Agreement.  
Co-operation, for the EC – and, particularly, for its External Relations 
Directorate General -, encompasses a very broad array of issues, going beyond 
the strict economic sphere. Sustainability of democratic regimes is one of them, 
considered as a key area and background to other relations and agreements. 
Even  within  the  economic  and  trade  context,  the  number  of  questions  and 
projects may easily be too high, as they can relate to manufactures, services or 
agriculture, as well as investment and macro-economic issues, not to mention 
the closely related fields of education and culture.  
In  the  Sixth  Meeting  of  the  EU-Mercosul  bi-regional  negotiations 
committee, held in Brussels in October 2001, the Subgroup on Economic Co-
operation  “agreed  on  joint  draft  texts  in  the  fields  of  Scientific  and 
Technological  Co-operation,  Energy,  Transport,  Telecommunications, 
Information  Technology  and  Information  Society”,  as  reported  in  its  Final 
Conclusions; agriculture and environment being also in the agenda. 
All this makes a clear point in favour of dedicating more attention to co-
operation issues and opportunities within the EU-Mercosul context. Moreover, 
as well  known,  trade negotiations  are  progressively  becoming  the  tip  of  an 
iceberg,  containing  a  complex  network  of  activities  and  instances  which 
involve, complement and make possible the actual trade flows. A fact that also 
generates the need for more co-operation among the future members/partners. 
It would be impossible to cover here the variety of issues under the large 
umbrella of trade and co-operation. This report aims at shedding new light on, 
or stressing, a few selected themes, considered important for the Agreement. 
After a general framing of the trade and co-operation nexus and the feasibility 
of the broad co-operation agenda the EU likes to implement, we analyse, in 
separate  sections,  four  sectoral  issues:  phyto-sanitary  and  agricultural  co-operation ;  foreign  direct  investment  ;  telecommunications  and  information 
technology ; and cultural co-operation (trade related aspects of). 
The four chosen issues have several implications. The first and third 
ones  perhaps  do  not  need  any  intellectual  support,  their  importance  being 
nearly  evident.  Co-operation  on  investment  has  progressively  received 
attention,  and  involves  multiple  actions,  ranging  from  the  set  of  “business 
facilitation  practices”  to  specific  themes,  as  streamlining  of  legislation  and 
protocols in both sides and the question of remittances. This not to mention the 
creation of a level playing field regarding right of establishment, something 
that has been somewhat off balance in favour of the EU. The cultural side has 
important connections with relevant trade aspects, particularly the question of 
intellectual property rights, beyond constituting a point d’honneur for many EU 
members, notably France. 
  In section 4 we launch a new idea. A more strategic option, indirectly 
contained in the EU agenda: mechanisms for dispute settlement co-operation in 
the WTO; something that could positively enhance a harmonious link between 
a regional integration agreement and the multilateral stance. 
In section 5, a broader view is recast, introducing a few other specific 
points where synergies may occur between the two partners. The discussion 
contributes  to  a  deeper  analysis  of  the  proposal,  framing  it  under  different 
categories. Of course, many other areas remain outside it. A key one relates to 
the well-known question of structural adjustment. The EU has an enormous 
experience in this area, while Mercosur will, sooner than soon, be required to 
have a regional – as opposed to a national – position on this. The Agreement 
creates a good occasion to tackle the structural adjustment issue, and connected 
ideas,  under  the  co-operation  heading.  This  debate  joins  all  the  previous 
findings in the closure of the report, in section 6. 
 
  
2. General analysis of the trade and co-operation idea - A critical view of 
the EU co-operation agenda in the bi-regional negotiations.  
2.1  A  theoretical  framework  for  analysing  co-operation  efforts  in  regional 
integrations. 
 
According  to  certain  international  relations  theories,  co-operation  among 
nations is an outgrowth of individual desires, capacities and choices. In the 
context of regional integration agreements (RIAs), Devlin (2002) is perhaps the 
first attempt to establish a logical basis to analyse the co-operation dimension. 
Drawing on Sandler (1992), he sees regional integrations as an impure public 
good, and co-operation beyond the trade sphere may help in getting them closer 
to a pure, non-exclusive (true) public good. He introduces the idea of the “trade 
and  co-operation  nexus”  (T+C),  involving  systematic  co-operation  in  both 
trade-related and non-trade areas, and thoroughly analyses the intensity of the 
(T+C) in different existing preferential agreements. Particular attention is given 
to the EU cases, notably the EU-Mercosul negotiations. 
Economists have long tried to introduce the public goods concept in 
the  discussion  of  the  international  political-economic  system.  Kindleberger 
(1973) used  it to develop his version of hegemonic  theory, though its later 
contributors  preferred  instead  to  draw  from  Olson  (1965)’s
1.  The  idea  of 
impure public goods is also not new, and can be found, for instance, in the 
developments of club theory by Buchanan (1965) and others, in the mid-sixties.  
Economic theory tells us that the basic characteristics of a public good 
are  nonrivalness  –  when  the  good  is  consumed  by  one  individual,  another 
person  is  not  pre-empted  from  consuming  it  at  the  same  time,  or  rather, 
rationing  of  the  good  is  not  desirable  –  and  nonexcludability  –  preventing 
others from sharing in the benefits of the good’s consumption is not possible, 
or rather, rationing of the good is not feasible
2.   
                                                            
1  We  are  neither  going  to  touch  nor  discuss  the  ideas  of  hegemonic  theory  here.  Those 
interested in the subject – which is regaining attention thanks to the present world situation - 
can find perceptive reviews in Gowa (1993) and Keohane (1984).  
2 See, for instance, Stiglitz (1988).  Dwelling  on  Devlin’s  idea,  we  would  add  that  the  nowadays 
complexity of RIAs has greatly contributed to blur the perception of the above 
characteristics in a given agreement. Indeed, the complexity almost forces the 
main  negotiators  –  diplomats,  in  many  countries  –  to  look  for  help  in 
specialised groups of society, or class organisations directly concerned with the 
particular issue at stake, naturally excluding large segments of the country that 
remain  unaware  of,  or  do  not  understand,  the  potential  benefits  that  could 
accrue to all. The result is that, at least psychologically, nonexcludability is 
impaired. Once this happens, nonrivalness may easily become vapid, as many 
people  do  not  know  how  to  participate  in  the  benefits  of  the  integration. 
Nonrivalness can also be impaired due to the different timings required for 
each  benefit  to  become  reality  (see,  for  instance, Flôres  (1996)), what  may 
trigger a competition among the interested and well informed on the sequence 
of implementing the agreement’s measures. 
When the ideal characteristics do not entirely apply, one has an impure 
public good, i.e., one in which . The arguments in the previous paragraph show 
that  modern  RIAs  can  many  times  indeed  qualify  as  rather  impure  public 
goods.  Apparently,  there  exist  only  two  ways  of  minimising  these  effects, 
turning the regional integration into a “better”, or less impure, public good.  
The first is a larger participation of the civil society in the debates on 
the agreement, in order to (ideally) include the whole country in the process of 
tailoring the integration (public) good. This has been taking place somehow, 
though  sometimes  the  excessive  politicisation  of  the  debate  creates  another 
problems,  one  being  the  polarisation  of  arguments  into  marked  ideological 
corners. Undoubtedly, a new challenge to the modern RIAs negotiators and 
builders  is  going  to  be  how  to  open  the  debate  to  society’s  vast  majority 
without letting it stall in a few yes-or-no emotional positions. 
The second is a comprehensive (T+C), that will engage other groups 
beyond the negotiators and trade-related actors, increasing the awareness and 
understanding of the integration, while boosting its purely trade aspects. This 
may substantially enlarge the number of people concerned with the integration, at the same time that a different dimension of the process is conveyed. At the 
side of the inevitable tit-for-tat of trade and market access negotiations, a sense 
of common goals and achievements may be created.  
Without being a panacea, co-operation does seem to be an important 
tool for oiling modern RIAs. Notwithstanding, it shares a political economy 
dimension  with  the  trade  negotiations.  Clearly,  the  choice  of  the  favoured 
areas, and related projects, may also be viewed as the outcome of interactions 
among domestic “co-operation lobbies”, or of optimising different political co-
operation functions
3, and the joint acceptance of the co-operation agenda can – 
at least in principle – be seen under the light of a now external interaction of 
these  forces.  Without  denying  this  view,  we  take  it  as  a  second-order 
consideration, which might be useful in certain instances. Fundamentally, it 
does  not  invalidate  the  role  just  outlined  for  co-operation,  in  the  sense  of 
enlarging the perception of and the involvement in the integration process.    
 
2.2.  A critical view of the EU co-operation efforts. 
  
The EU seems to have been long sensible to the powerful role of a (T+C), 
having  sometimes  started  solely  with  co-operation  measures  that  eventually 
evolved into a (T+C) in their third or fourth generation agreements
4. Usually, 
once  an  agreement  in  the  (T+C)  spirit  is  signed,  the  Commission  issues  a 
country (or group of countries) paper, detailing the co-operation initiatives and 
the  budget  for  funding  them  from  the  EU  side.  Though  in  previous 
negotiations,  like  the  one  with  Mexico,  interim  or  partial  agreements  were 
being  signed  along  the  negotiation  process,  the  Mercosul-EU  negotiations 
follow the single undertaking principle, all dimensions of the agreement being 
closed at the same time.  
In  spite  of  their  undeniably  pioneering  aspect,  the  EU  co-operation 
efforts  have  not  been  free  of  criticism.  The  first  relates  to  the  well-known 
                                                            
3 Depending on which political-economy-of-trade model the reader prefers.  “Brussels-bureaucracy”,  which  many  times  considerably  slowed  down 
initiatives received with great enthusiasm when first proposed. The second, a 
criticism common to perhaps all co-operation projects, is that part of the funds 
revert to EU firms and consultancies, co-operation almost serving as a way to 
generate  revenues  to  different  EU  providers.  Finally,  most  co-operation 
programmes are too ambitious, dealing with too many areas/projects. Devlin 
(2002) correctly, and cautiously, states that co-operation projects should not be 
too numerous, at the risk of a poor implementation of too many initiatives, 
producing a final negligible impact. The combined result of these shortcomings 
is  that  for  some  people  EU  co-operation  is  just  rhetoric;  a  coherent  and 
beautiful rhetoric – given its emphasis on democratic and human values –, but 
nothing much beyond this. 
Few  and  well  focussed  projects  seem  the  optimal  starting  point  for 
building a successful (T+C) nexus. In this paper we have been faithful to this 
idea.  The  five  dimensions  discussed  in  the  next  two  sections  work  in  a 
perspective  not  too  far  from  the  (T+C)  role  outlined  above,  though  more 
restrict.  They  exploit  two  of  the  important  purposes  of  a  (T+C).  First,  as 
already mentioned, facilitate and boost the actual trade flows; second, help in 
creating an enabling environment for more trade and economic relations. That 
is why classical, as well as key, EU co-operation measures in the socio-political 
dimension  –  like  building  or  strengthening  of  democratic  institutions,  or 
poverty alleviation – are not discussed here. That is why also, especially within 
the latter purpose, the discussion of “Mechanisms for dispute settlement co-
operation in the WTO” has been introduced in the study. Up to our knowledge 
this is an innovation; nobody in the two sides seems to have thought of creating 
ways to follow up the broad EU-Mercosul contentieux, with the simultaneous 
purpose  of  keeping  a  constructive  dialogue  high  and  avoiding  tit-for-tat 
measures that hinder trade and business opportunities.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
4 Devlin (2002) also makes a good survey of this process with each (developing country) EU 
partner.   The four co-operation areas we single out in section 3 may give origin to 
both  country  or  bloc  co-operation  initiatives,  as  will  be  summarised  later. 
Nearly all of them share the side effect of an improvement on standards and 
quality in general, enhancing the competitiveness of the economies involved. 
Co-operation on dispute settlement is clearly at a bloc, or regional, level and 




3. Sector-specific co-operations and their possible impacts within a trade 
and development framework. 
 
3.1. Phyto-sanitary measures and agriculture. 
 
The  Uruguay  Round  Agreement  on  the  Application  of  Sanitary  and  Phyto-
sanitary Measures (SPSM) opened the road to the protectionist use of internal 
food safety regulations against competitive foreign suppliers. The Agreement 
was reasonably careful in relating, in its Annex A, international standards and 
recommendations  for  food  safety  to  those  in  the  Codex  Alimentarius 
Commission, and, for animal health and zoonoses, to those of the International 
Office  of  Epizootics.  Unfortunately,  as  with  other  GATT/WTO  devices  – 
notably the antidumping code -, the well-intentioned articles soon acquired a 
double-edge meaning, being used for good as well as bad purposes. Moreover, 
all the proceedings involved in its Annex C – Control, Inspection and Approval 
Procedures may easily be performed faster or slower, according to the purposes 
of the (potential) importer. 
The  EU  has  a  strict  internal  food  safety  policy  –  usually  rigorously 
applied to its domestic producers -, what makes it easier and more palatable the 
protectionist use of the SPSM. In the Mercosul, Brazil, for instance, has been 
very restrained in the use of the Agreement, the only complaint against him having originated, ironically, from the EU, regarding its seed-potato exports
5. 
However, the Agreement may pose problems if closer trade relations take place 
between the two  blocs. In order to  avoid this we identify an important co-
operation line in all aspects related to meat and animal products in general. 
Though  Mercosul  enjoyed  a  reasonably  good  reputation  in  its  meat 
exports to the EU, which still can give it a competitive edge over new entrants 
like Poland - that, were not for lying reasonably far from fitting into the EU 
requirements, could damage its market share -, problems have been marring 
this  reputation.  The  first  is  the  serious  epidemics  that  attacked  different 
Uruguayan herds. Secondly, there have been problems in Brazil regarding the 
EU traceability requirements for bovine meat. Though the latter has not been 
used as a trade restriction yet, the EU authorities have signalled that fulfilling 
such requirements are an important condition to supplying the EU market. Co-
operation in the definition and application of the sanitary measures and, in the 
particular  case  of  traceability,  on  the  proper  checking  and  measurement 
techniques, is perhaps the best way to ease tensions in both sides and pave the 
road to a fuller and more open trade in agriculture between them. 
Another  area  concerns  co-operation  in  the  genetically  modified 
organisms (GMOs) issue. Traditionally, attitudes towards GMOs in the US and 
the EU are considered to oppose each other, the former being seen as open to 
transgenics and the latter as strongly resistant to their introduction
6. Reality is 
more complex though ; not only unanimity with respect to GMOs does not 
exist in the US, as the EU is progressively admitting some GMOs. Mercosul, as 
a whole, would broadly be placed between these two poles, with Argentina 
leaning closer to the US approach – 95 per cent of its soya output comes from 
transgenic seeds - and Brazil being nowadays one or two steps ahead of the EU 
standing.  The  EU  has  tough  regulations  on  labelling  and  traceability  of 
products that, somewhere in the production chain, have used GMOs. These 
                                                            
5 These exports amounted to around US$ 1 million, and the complaint was recently settled in 
the April, 2003 meeting of the (WTO) Committee on Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures. 
6 For those interested in acquiring a deeper knowledge on this theme, Chrispeels and Sadava 
(2003), specially chapters 18 and 20, is a good modern reference. regulations are due to become stricter after new requirements to be issued by 
next November. In the Brazilian case, transgenic soybeans are the major target, 
given the country’s position as a main soya exporter and the diversified use of 
this crop in other agricultural and animal produce. At present, many issues are 
at stake, including the minimum percentage of transgenics that would make 
labelling mandatory. This is crucial because the lower the percentage level, the 
higher the costs of labelling for the producer. Given Mercosul’s intermediate 
position  in  this  hot  subject,  and  the  initial  stage  of  regulatory  and  safety 
measures for a wider use in a main exporter like Brazil, co-operation in GMOs 
policy is an important area where the more convergence is achieved, the higher 
are the gains for both partners, either in their reciprocal trade or in a common 
external GMOs policy.   
  
3.2. Investment and related issues. 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a recurrent theme in Mercosul. All members 
want to attract as much FDI as possible and, in the past, relations have not been 
smooth in this field, as internal competition for FDI has in a few times evolved 
into nearly conflicting situations. FDI discussions involve different dimensions, 
ranging from the relatively vague idea of a level playing field to specifics like 
remmittances  policies.  Notwithstanding,  Mercosul  countries  share  a  greater 
identity with the EU – rather than with the US or other developed nations – in 
their international position regarding foreign investment. This common view 
could act as a starting point for a fruitful co-operation scheme. 
  The Colonia Protocol, dealing with investment rules for the common 
market, lies semi-abandoned, in a vivid example of the difficulties surrounding 
the theme. Given  that not even in the EU one can consider to  face a fully 
harmonised  situation,  the  two  blocs  could  develop  a  serious  co-operation 
programme with the limited objective of having a single, bloc-to-bloc policy on 
FDI. This would be a wonderful incentive for Mercosul pushing forward its own set of common rules, while both blocs would try to design basic criteria 
applicable to all member countries.  
Advancing the proposal is not a too difficult effort, and could give way 
to a rich set of case studies. Indeed, EU FDI in Mercosul is mainly a business 
of five members – the UK, Germany, France, Spain and Portugal -, the other 
actors  –  like  the  Netherlands  or  Sweden  –  having  a  more  limited  and  less 
diversified presence. On the other hand, Mercosul FDI in the EU is basically 
located in Portugal and Spain. A specific-to-general approach, in which rules 
and procedures would be first polished with the main agents – under the light 
of  concrete  questions  presently  at  stake  -  and  then  submitted  to  the 
corresponding  general  bodies,  could  bear  interesting  fruits  in  a  short  time 
horizon.  The  EU  experience  –  in  this  case,  most  in  its  failures  than  in  its 
successes – would be of extreme value, creating an area of actual interchange 
and effective building up of both common markets.      
 
3.3. Telecommunications and information technology
7. 
 
Telecommunications is a domain where a deep interplay not only among the 
goods  and  services  sectors,  but  also  the  connected  rules,  protocols  and 
standards  takes  place.  It  is  impossible  to  discuss  trade  in  telecom  services 
without a view on the related impact in the telecom and information technology 
equipment trade and on the constraints imposed by specific standards and other 
global technical  definitions. Moreover,  it is the sector  where regulation  has 
moved  farther,  posing  complex  problems  whose  solution  may  again 
considerably  affect  the  goods  and  services  trade,  as  well  as  foreign  direct 
investment in the sector. 
   The EU-Mercosul negotiations in telecoms adopted as a starting point 
the annex to the 4
th GATS Protocol known as Reference Document on Basic 
Telecommunications Services. This was an important gesture as, at the WTO, while the EU adopted the Reference Document, Argentina is the only Mercosul 
country to have done the same. Brazil, Mercosul’s biggest telecoms market, 
presented,  in  April  2001,  a  proposal  on  the  adoption  of  the  Reference 
Document. However, it met opposition from Japan, Hong-Kong, the US and 
the EU itself, particularly due to restrictions on foreign ownership of telecom 
firms.  So,  while  convergence  seems  to  be  likely  within  the  EU-Mercosul 
agreement, at Geneva the impasse continues. 
  Two crucial areas stand out as key co-operation nexuses in this context. 
The first is migration from second (2G) to third generation (3G) of cell phones 
networks, a process highly dependent on the structure and technology of the 
existing  2G  network.  This  is  because  the  basic  universal  standard  for  3G 
technologies – the IMT-2000 defined by the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU) – is, as often happens, broad enough to accommodate different 
specific technologies. The new 3G environments, beyond allowing the much 
expected global roaming facility, will achieve nearly total convergence among 
fixed  and  mobile  voice  services,  data  and  image  transmission,  Internet  and 
multimedia services. This means a prospectively huge enterprise in both blocs, 
specially  in  Mercosul  where  telecoms  penetration  lags  behind  the  EU  (see 
Exhibit 1).  
Co-operation here means serious business, with the possibility of very 
significant gains in the medium to long-run. The point of departure is in the 
EU’s favour as establishment of the 2G network has not been completed yet in 
Mercosul.  In  Brazil,  for  instance,  a  much  heated  debate  is  taking  place  as 
Vésper, the local representative of the US firm Qualcomm, wants to extend an 
acquired right to exploit cell-phone services in the 1.8 GHz band to the 1.9 
GHz band. The latter has in principle been assigned by the Brazilian regulator 
to  3G  services,  and  use  of  it  by  Vésper  would  place  the  firm’s  cell-phone 
technology, the CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access), in a vantage point as 
regards  the  competing  GSM  (Global  Standard  Mobile)  technology  for  3G 
                                                                                                                                                                      
7  This subsection  draws  partially on Viana  (2003). Those interested in  acquiring  a better 
knowledge of the technical concepts and procedures here mentioned should consult a specific migration
8. The whole affair is twice more strategic because, ironically, half of 
the existing cell-phones networks are neither GSM nor CDMA, using rather the 
phased out TDMA (Time Division Multiple Access) technology and are in the 
process of being replaced by the two competitive standards. 
 
 
Exhibit 1. Telecoms penetration in Mercosul and the EU ; a few indicators - 2001. 
  EU  Mercosul 
Telephones* : fixed  55.4  17.7 
                 mobile  72.4  13.9 
Internet users*  31.4  3.9 
Personal computers*  30.0  5.1 
Households with TV**  147.0  47.6 
* per 100 people ; ** absolute number (in millions). 
Source : International Telecommunications Union. 
 
 
The GSM technology, present in 193 countries, is dominant in the EU. 
This actual example shows how co-operation in this area might have significant 
trade spillovers. Moreover, even after having decided how migration to the 3G 
environment will be performed, there remains scope for co-operation on the 
various stages of the process. 
The second area is digital TV, an innovation that, though nowadays less 
overemphasised as the technical revolution in multimedia reception, will still 
have  a  profound  impact  on  future  developments  in  information  (and 
entertainment)  transmission.  Again,  though  the  EU  has  already  defined  its 
standard,  the  DBV  (also  adopted  by  Australia,  New  Zealand,  India  and 
Singapore), things have not been settled in Mercosul yet. Argentina already 
opted for the competing ATSC standard (adopted by Canada, South Korea, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(though not too technical) work like Horrocks and Scarr (1994), for instance. 
8 It is of course completely outside our purpose – and entirely senseless – to state a position or 
judgement on the issue. Vésper claims that its decision is backed by Resolutions issued by 
ANATEL, the national telecoms regulator. Taiwan and the US). If Brazil adopts the DBV, or a hybrid form, there will be 
significant motives for technical co-operation in this area. 
A third issue, perhaps as relevant as the two previous ones, is Internet 
access and penetration. Both in Mercosul as in the EU, there are clear signs that 
Internet  traffic  will  progressively  dominate  telecommunications  flows.  This 
will have a great impact on the structure of the equipments industry and the 
costs  of  the  service  providers.  To  overcome  or  attenuate  this  impact,  more 
peering-backbone connections, in which a peripheral internet user is directly 
connected  to  an  internet  backbone  (provided  flows  in  both  sides  of  the 
connection are approximately equal), will be needed. No Mercosul country has 
such a connection nowadays, what amounts to higher internet costs to all its 
members, as backbones are located either in the US or the EU. Co-operation in 
order to implement such cost-reducing measure, as well as on the issues of 
taxation and use of broadband connections is clearly needed. 
In the telecoms galaxy, there are many other areas where co-operation 
makes sense. Examples could cover information gateways entry and utilisation 
rights ; spectrum, numbering, naming and addressing management ; pricing and 
cost  accounting  policies ;  open  systems  and  networks  interconnection,  or 
customers  and  universal  service  requirements
9.  Given  the  purposes  of  this 
paper, we think however the three cases above illustrate why telecoms qualify 
as a key co-operation area.  
Finally, it is worth reminding that, contrary to the US, where telecoms 
(internal) deregulation dates at least since the famous Modification of Final 
Judgement by Judge Greene, blowing up ATT’s monopoly in 1982, the EU, 
like Mercosul, started the process quite recently, facing nowadays problems 
which are similar to those of Mercosul. Co-operation, even in a broad way, on 
the difficult economic, technical and institutional questions which lie in the 
fuzzy border separating the telecoms and competition regulators can make a lot 
of sense, beyond being fruitful for both regions.               
3.4. Culture. 
 
Culture and education are the most important co-operation subjects to assure a 
long term, stable and ever closer relationship between two groups of nations. 
The  problems  created  by  the  successive  EU  enlargements,  since  the  one 
following the Delors’s Initiative, and the tragic way in which fragmentation 
took place in the Balkans have attracted the attention of RIA researchers to the 
former Austro-Hungarian empire. Though still being a puzzle to some, there is 
nowadays a certain consensus that only the addition of the common threads – 
and  the  ensuing  uniform  and  detailed,  though  massive,  administrative 
procedures, going many times down to district level – forged by a particular 
branch  of  German  culture,  flexible  enough  to  accommodate  key  Slav  and 
Magyar influences, can explain the incredible survival and unity, over its last 
few decades, of a power already in shambles
10.  
Cultural  links,  and  the  galaxy  of  common  (or  similar)  habits,  things, 
patterns, rules and attitudes derived from them, constitute a solid way of gluing 
nations  together.  No  wonder  the  continuing  fight  between  the  US  film  and 
entertainment industry and its EU counterparts: much more than an economic 
issue is at stake. At the same time, an encompassing integration as the one the 
EU desires with Mercosul can only be achieved through the strengthening of 
cultural and educational links. 
It  is  in  education,  rather  than  in  culture  in  general,  that  the  EU  co-
operation initiatives have perhaps been more successful. In Mercosul, and in 
the  whole  of  Latin  America  as  well,  out  of  the  seven  special  projects 
administered by the EuropeAid Co-operation Office of the EU, two aim at the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
9  Many  of  these  terms  may  sound  rather  technical  to  the  reader:  they  are.  In  a  digital 
technology environment, numbering – i.e., user identification -, for instance, became a crucial 
issue, raising specific and complex problems.  
10 The literature on the Habsburg, Austro-Hungarian empire is enormous and, of course, much 
has nothing to do with the issues in this paper. Classical, and not very difficult or massive, 
works like Blanning (1994) and Taylor (1948, 1954) can however be of value. Conybeare and 
Sandler (1990) is also interesting, and less far from our theme.  interchange of students, academic staff, building up common research projects 
and  the  development  of  joint  degrees  (see  Exhibit  2).  In  other  aspects  of 
culture, particularly the entertainment industry, the presence is more limited, 
though, for instance, in the movie sector, joint ventures among Mercosul and 




Exhibit 2. The main EU co-operation programmes in Latin America - 2002. 
Programme  Area – main purpose 
AL-INVEST  Investment – encourage small and medium sized 
EU and LA firms seeking co-operation 
ALFA   Education – promotion of higher education 
URBAL  Urbanism – establish direct and lasting links 
between EU and LA cities 
ALURE  Energy – encourage an optimal and most rational 
use of energy 
ATLAS  Business  –  economic  co-operation  through  a 
network of Chambers of Industry and Commerce 
@LIS  Information Technology – promote the benefits of 
IT and bridge the gap of the digital divide 
Alban  Education  –  reinforcement  of  the  EU-LA  co-
operation in higher education; training in the EU 
for LA professionals. 
Source : European Commission – DG External Relations. 
 
 
Including all possibilities of co-operation in this vast area would be to 
reproduce, in a smaller scale, the same mistake usually attached to the global 
EU  initiatives:  too  many  projects,  almost  sure  candidates  to  inefficient 
management. As in agriculture or telecoms, we have a more targeted proposal. Irrespectively of the existing – and welcome new ones – projects, co-
operation funds in the framework of the agreement could be directed at three 
objectives. The first would be reaching a common definition of a cultural firm, 
which would enjoy specific privileges in both regional spaces, being able to 
particular concessions in the other bloc and, sometimes, identical working and 
performing  conditions.  The  concessions  would  mean  greater  flexibility  and 
easiness  in  its  mobility  and  activities  throughout  the  two  blocs,  while  the 
identical conditions would open the possibility – at the discretion of the local 
sponsoring authorities, like, for instance, festival organisers – for the firm to 
enjoy the same grants, facilities and liberties given to the local ones. This is a 
bold  proposition  which  would  demand  further  study,  but  undoubtedly 
represents a step forward in a closer cultural co-operation. Eventually, both 
sides  could  create  a  (modest)  joint  fund  to  support  travelling  and  activities 
abroad of these firms.  
The  second  proposal  deals  with  the  audiovisual  services,  where 
inevitably there exist identities in both sides of the Atlantic and, in spite of a 
greater lack of capital in the Mercosul side, the two blocs are competitive with 
respect to each other. Mercosul movies are well accepted in the EU, the same 
applying, in principle, to the EU ones ; both however lack powerful distribution 
channels. Outlets should not be restricted to the classical theatre or projection 
room, DVDs, videos and the TV – where specially Brazilian soap-operas have 
a market still to explore – being very important alternatives. Again, it may be 
hard to believe that, given the enormous and systematic pressure that the US 
industry makes on Brussels for total liberalisation of this sector, the EU would 
be able to make a special opening to Mercosul. However, the point here is not 
on GATS plus rules for Mercosul – a subject to be discussed in the trade in 
services negotiations -, but on co-operation between the two sectors aiming at 
improving  distribution  channels  and  increasing  penetration  in  each  other 
region.  Truly,  between  a  GATS  commitment  and  local  regulations  –  for 
instance, regarding the hours per-week allowed to non-EU soap operas and 
movies in a regional TV channel – there is margin for manoeuvre ; a margin that, without harming the non-discrimination clause, can be used to the benefit 
of a partner. 
The third project relates to property rights. The cultural industry is one 
of the sectors where more problems related to intellectual property rights occur. 
In this area, not only counterfaiting – of CDs, DVDs and similar media – is a 
problem, but due and fast appropriation of rights, in the multiple instances they 
generate revenue in the cultural world, is also problematic. Co-operation would 
mean  a  project  to  streamline  procedures  in  both  sides,  so  that  rights  and 
royalties  would  be  quickly  collected  and  remmitted,  at  the  same  time  that 
enforcement would receive special attention.         
 
 
4. Dispute settlement co-operation in the WTO. 
 
Annex  2  of  the  Uruguay  Round,  Understanding  on  Rules  and  Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, represented a major departure from the 
existing (GATT’s) mechanism to solve disputes among contracting parties. In 
particular,  two  organisms,  the  Dispute  Settlement  Body  (DSB)  and  the 
Appellate Body (AB), were created within the WTO, with the sole purpose of 
administering the rules and proceedings in the Understanding and, in the case 
of  the  Appellate  Body,  functioning  as  a  last  recourse  (see,  for  instance, 
Palmeter and Mavroidis (1999)).  
It is not the goal of this section to discuss the encompassing impact of 
the Understanding and the pros and cons associated with the increased weight 
of juridical content and procedures in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. 
Sticking to undeniable facts, the first finding is that the frequency of use of the 
DSB  and  its  panels  surprised  even  the  more  optimistic  defenders  of  the 
Understanding. Secondly, panels have up to now behaved in a quite neutral 
mode,  being  fair  to  say  that  no  evidence  of  bias  in  favour  of  a  particular 
member – specially the more powerful ones, as some feared – can be raised. It 
is within this context of a very active DSB that our proposal comes. From January 1997 to March 2001, out of all the panels concluded at the 
DSB (or the AB) there were 14 involving the EU and at least one Mercosul 
member. In only two of these, both blocs/members figured as third parties, in 
the remaining twelve, at least one Mercosul member or the EU figured either as 
complainant  or  accused  (see  Exhibit  3).  These  panels  covered  a  variety  of 
WTO agreements and, as usual, it cost about 12 to 18 months to reach a final 
decision. 
The amount of time spent until reaching a decision and the uncertainty 
on  whether  the  losing  side  will  implement  the  conclusion  are  main 
shortcomings of resorting to the DSB. In case the decision is not implemented, 
or  even  when  immediately  applied,  the  question  of  sanctions  is  a  further 
problem. Even when enforcement is feasible – what is not always evident -, 
sanctions many times backfire, with the winner also losing part of its trade 
welfare.  Moreover, specially  in Mercosul countries where  legal  assistance on  
 
 
Exhibit 3. Concluded panels at the DSB (or AB) where both the EU and at least one 
Mercosul member took part – January, 1997 to March, 2001. 
  Number of cases 
As complainant and accused  3 
As complainant, accused and third party  1 
As either complainant or accused and 
third party 
8 
Both as third party  2 
TOTAL  14 
 
 
trade/WTO law is not very developed, individual exporters, when in trouble, 
don’t know what is the best option: using the DSB at Geneva or appealing to 
the domestic commercial defence system, in a local court. Finally, as panels 
engage directly in the case, without the help of a preliminary analysis of the 
juridical aspect of the problem, it is not uncommon to find panels stalled in a controversial  matter,  involving  different,  conflicting  international  treaties  or 
commitments. 
Considerable time and energy would be saved if, within a co-operation 
framework,  a  previous  consultation  system  for  any  potential  dispute  at  the 
WTO were created. The system would perform a preliminary analysis of the 
juridical foundations of the complaint, trying to reach a friendly solution. In 
this effort, both parties would make an evaluation of the costs and benefits of 
engaging in a WTO panel, in contrast to the gains in a quick, internal (to both) 
solution. Advice on the best legal ways to conduct  the case  would also be 
provided.  
Such co-operation requires the establishment of a permanent group or 
committee responsible for the tasks outlined above; the group being consulted 
whenever  a  potential  conflict  aroused.  The  proposal  then  encompasses  the 
dispute settlement procedure discussed in the ongoing negotiations. This one 
relates  only  to  the  disputes  that  could  emerge  in  the  framework  of  the 
agreement,  while  the  co-operation  envisaged  deals  with  all  potential  WTO 
cases, going beyond those inside the agreement flows. Moreover, as Exhibit 3 
shows, many times one bloc is involved in the case, while the other enters only 
as  a  third  partner.  The  co-operation  mechanism  would  also  be  a  privileged 
source of information, with the blocs exchanging views and strategies even 
when they are only one of the two main parties. 
Finally, better guidance would be provided on the choice of a domestic 
commercial defence case versus a WTO panel. This is a crucial point where a 
lot of misunderstanding is present. Reciprocal ignorance, by EU exporters on 
the  Mercosul  members  defence  systems  and,  from  Mercosul,  on  the 
(voluminous  and)  elaborate  EU  foreign  trade  legislation,  accounts  for  a 
considerable  waste  of  time  and  resources  in  solving  cases  which  do  not 
necessarily justify a panel, though causing damage to either the exporter or the 
domestic competitors.     
Implementation of the idea is not difficult as the basic cell would be the 
body created for the agreement, which – in the co-operation project – would receive supplementary funds for performing its enlarged activities. We estimate 
a considerable gain in time from such co-operation mechanism.   
  
  
5. Application to the EU-Mercosul present negotiations. 
 
We  outlined  in  the  previous  sections  a  moderate  portfolio  of  co-operation 
initiatives.  The  five  dimensions  briefly  discussed  make  for  a  manageable 
though significant group. In this section we move back to a global view in 
order to have a finer judgement of the proposal. An initial point to be remarked 
is that the several ideas/projects can be classified according to different criteria. 
Exhibit 4, which will guide the present analysis, shows that the overall result is 
a high diversity of project types. 
The first criterium concerns who are the actors of the co-operation ? The 
nations or individual economic agents and social groups ? As in many trade 
relations, both can be true. The projects allow for varied forms of interaction ; 
while in a common food safety policy regarding transgenics, as in a common 
statute for cultural industries, governmental involvement will be deep – though 
not exclusive -, in the telecoms projects individual firms and providers will 
probably have a much more prominent role. This begs the question whether, in 
certain cases, one is really dealing with the co-operation instance or with a 
fairly crude facilitation measure, that will clearly benefit a specific group of 
firms/providers  in  one  or  both  sides.  In  other  words,  the  political  economy 
dimension  of  co-operation  crudely  emerges
11.  This  distinction  is  sometimes 
hard to identify, but we do not think it to be a criterium to reject a co-operation 
effort.  
The locus where to trace the dividing line should be whether the co-
operation project drastically limits or excludes other alternatives – as in the 
case of a competing standard – or, on the contrary, it improves competition 
among  alternatives,  while  helping  in  better  qualifying  the  decision  making 
                                                            
11 See the comment at the end of section 2.1. process.  Looking  at  the  column  ²Restricts ?²  in  Exhibit  4  we  see  that  this 
possibility exists for five out of the ten projects, being greater in two of them. 
Such  a  situation  is,  to  a  certain  extent,  inevitable  when  dealing  with 
fundamental  technical  or  juridical  matters  (all  the  five  projects  are  in  this 
class). Of course, taking the blunt example of the 3G standard in telecom, once 
the  decision  has  been  taken,  there  is  no  point  in  blocking  a  co-operation 
initiative  that  will  eventually  contribute  to  a  better  implementation  of  the 
choice already made. 
 In spite of their diversity in other dimensions, all projects can be viewed 
as trade-enhancing (column 4, Exhibit 4), and so, as economic co-operation. 
This has a practical  importance because economic co-operation,  contrary to 
either financial and technical or social and cultural, has not been closed in the 
negotiations yet and, if needed (and wanted), all the proposals can be put under 
this umbrella. 
Most projects have a true regional perspective, as opposed to a country 
basis. This will demand a higher cohesion from Mercosul in order to design 
consistent  regional  co-operation  programmes.  As  a side  effect,  co-operation 
will  also  help  deepening  the  integration,  this  being  the  last  classificatory 
dimension (²Needs homework ?²). Perhaps the best example in this case is the 
investment protocol, and the related harmonisation measures.  
  There  also  synergies  and  inter-realtionships  among  the  ten  projects. 
Though the telecom ones (4 to 6) bear a technical character, they can produce 
externalities for two of the cultural ones, namely 7 and 8. Project 3 can inpact 
at least the whole set from 4 to 9, the lastter also impacting 3. The dispute 
settlement co-operation in project 10 may boost the benefits accruing from all 
the  other  projects.  As  expected,  due  to  their  very  specific  character,  the 
agricultural  proposals stand more aside of the others. Nevertheless, they are 
important building blocks in the task of approximating the EU and Mercosul 
sectors. 
Thus,  the  proposal  passes  through  varied  checks  and  seems  to  touch 
different areas that can be reached only through cooperation, making for a quite  Exhibit 4. The proposed projects classified into several dimensions. 
PROJECTS  Actors ?  Restricts ?  Trade-enhancing ?  National or regional?  Needs homework ? 
1. Sanitary & safety  States  No  Yes  Regional  Maybe (M) 
2. GMOs policy  States  May  Yes  National/regional  Yes (M+EU) 
3. Rules harm. (FDI)  States  No/may  Yes  National/regional  Yes (M+EU) 
4. 3G migration  1. Firms, 2. States  No/may  Yes  National  No 
5. Digital TV.  1. Firms, 2. States  May  Yes  National  No 
6. Internet links  Firms  No  Yes  National/regional  Maybe (M+EU) 
7. Cultural firm  States  No  Yes  National/regional  Maybe (M+EU) 
8. Audiovisual  Firms+States  No/may  Yes  National/regional  Maybe ( ?) 
9. I. property rights  States  No  Yes  Regional  No 










The co-operation initiatives outlined could make for a diversified and engaging 
agenda, ultimately  broadening the  perception and impact of the  Agreement. 
Classical  areas  of  emphasis  for  the  EU,  like  political  co-operation  and 
strengthening  of  democratic  institutions,  have  been  deliberately  left  out. 
However,  other  possibilities  still  remain.  A  key  one  relates  to  structural 
adjustment. The EU has an enormous experience in  this area, while Mercosul 
must, sooner than soon, have a regional – as opposed to a national – position on 
this.  
Before the Argentinean crisis, some authorities in Brazil had raised the 
idea of extending BNDES services to a Mercosul-basis, at least for selected 
sectors.  Though  the  proposal  met  mixed  reactions  within  the  country,  it  is 
slowly  gaining  a  wider  support.  At  the  same  time,  many  policy  makers  in 
Mercosul  would  like  to  see  in  a  EU-Mercosul  co-operation  agenda  a  huge 
“structural adjustment project”, with possibly  a percentage of  funds coming 
from the Brussels coffers. Though the Agreement creates a good occasion to 
tackle the structural adjustment issue under the co-operation heading, we find it 
completely far-fetched – actually a waste of time and energy – to count on EU 
money for Mercosul structural adjustment problems. A superficial analysis of 
the difficulties caused by the shifts in the EU structural funds programme, from 
the Iberian/Mediterranean members to the enlargement countries, and of the 
increasing demands the latter continue to make, shows that there is no room for 
an  extra-territorial,  Southern  Cone  initiative  in  this  field.  Undoubtedly, 
Mercosul must face the regional funds problem, but must also tackle it with its 
own resources and creativity. The above case offers a good example to close this paper. Indeed, two 
points are worth reminding when  analysing a (T+C) like the one proposed. 
First,  the  co-operation  agenda  should  be  clear,  compact  and  as  precise  as 
possible. Its projects can (and should) be varied, touching different dimensions 
within the regional space and sensitising agents at different levels. But clarity 
of objectives is mandatory, to allow for accountable country papers, in which 
targets can be matched to efforts and costs. Nevertheless, a second point brings 
to mind that big issues outside the agenda not necessarily should be avoided in 
a  global,  more  general  stance.  It  would  be  foolish  not  to  use  the  immense 
experience the EU has been having with structural adjustment quetions, when 
designing Mercosul’s measures in this field. But this can be done in a global 
co-operative  mood,  without  specific  commitments.  If,  by  chance,  a  clear 
project on the subject is identified, with mutual benefits, then nothing should 
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